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Using a novel database, this study assesses the impact of the perception of the personal 
benefits of the EU Cohesion Policy on support for the European project. The results show 
that the gap in support between people who claim to have benefited from the Cohesion 
Policy and those who feel they have not vanished once differences in individual traits and 
reverse causality are taken into account. This means that, despite the significant positive 
effect that the intensity of the Cohesion Policy in the region exerts on the perception of 
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Does the EU Cohesion Policy (CP) shape the mass attitudes towards the European 
integration process? More specifically, is support for the EU more frequent among 
citizens who benefit personally from the policy? This is an important question at least for 
two reasons. First, because the CP is the main policy tool of the EU, with most of its funds 
allocated to less developed regions and its interventions having the greatest expected 
impact on people’s everyday lives. Second, given its redistributive nature, the CP can 
compensate the population groups less favoured by the process of European integration, 
and in this way it could help counteract the current threats to the EU building process 
(e.g. the rise of Euroscepticism, populism, and neo-nationalism). Despite such 
implications, so far there is no direct empirical evidence on the relationship between the 
citizens’ perception of the personal benefits of the CP and their support for the European 
integration process. The main aim of this study is to contribute to filling this gap. 
To do so, the study benefits from a unique source of information, namely, the survey 
carried out under the umbrella of the H2020 PERCEIVE project.1 The corresponding 
database includes individuals’ responses to questions that capture the two phenomena of 
interest to this study, allowing us to assess the impact of the perception of having 
personally benefited from the CP on support for the EU. Additionally, it is possible to 
assign each respondent in the survey to the region where they lived and, therefore, to 
merge the individual-level data with the aggregated regional and country indicators, such 
as the intensity of the CP in the region. 
The mechanisms and determinants of the citizens’ opinion of the process of European 
integration and their degree of identification with Europe have been widely studied in the 
last decades, both from theoretical and empirical perspectives (for recent reviews see e.g. 
Barberio et al., 2017; Royuela and López-Bazo, 2019; and in particular Bergbauer, 2018). 
The extant literature suggests that the mass attitude toward the European project is 
affected by the degree of cognitive mobilization and political awareness of individuals. 
Specifically, it is argued that support for the EU and/or identification with the European 
project is greater among people who are more conscious of European issues and who are 
more interested in politics at the European level (Gabel, 1988; Clements, 2011; Chalmers 
                                               
1 PERCEIVE is an acronym that stands for ‘Perception and evaluation of Regional and Cohesion 
Policies by Europeans and Identification with the values of Europe’. 
https://www.perceiveproject.eu 
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and Dellmuth, 2015; Luhman, 2017). It has been shown that the perception of the EU also 
varies between individuals with different political values while, at the same time, it can 
be influenced by the opinion of leaders and parties’ political ‘cues’ (Gabel, 1988; Marks 
and Hooghe, 2003; Clements, 2011). Likewise, the evidence indicates that the 
identification with the process of European integration is not independent of the degree 
of attachment to national and even subnational identities (Hooghe and Marks, 2004 and 
2005; Serricchio et al., 2013, Risse, 2014; Capello, 2018; Capello, 2019), and that it is 
affected by citizens’ trust in European and national institutions, and by their effectiveness 
during the great recession (Armingeon and Ceka, 2014; Hooghe and Verhaegen, 2017). 
From a complementary perspective, the significant impact of the self-perception of the 
socio-economic situation of the individual agrees with the economic utilitarian theory that 
states that individuals tend to have a positive view of the EU if they benefit from the 
integration process (Verhaegen et al., 2014), and with the political economy and the 
winners/losers explanations of public opinion of European integration (Tucker et al., 
2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2004 and 2005; Capello and Perucca, 2019). In parallel, 
objective socio-economic conditions could shape the perception that different population 
groups have of the EU (Brinegar and Jolly, 2005; Braun and Tausendpfund, 2014; Borz 
et al., 2018). In this context, some studies focused on the specific role of the EU CP, 
coming to different conclusions. While the estimated effect of the amount of structural 
funds received by the region on support for European integration is positive and 
significant in some studies (Osterloh, 2011; Brasili et al., 2019), it is not significant 
(Chalmers and Dellmuth, 2015; Dellmuth and Chalmers, 2018) and even negative in 
others (Verhaegen et al., 2014). 
Borz et al. (2018) also consider the amount of structural funds per capita in the region, 
although their interest is in the effects on the formation of a European identity rather than 
in support for the EU.2 In addition, they focus on the interaction between perceived and 
real benefits, which means that they do not pay specific attention to the particular effect 
of the indicator of the CP intensity. Their estimated effects are statistically significant and 
positive, although of a moderate size. However, for us what is of greater importance is 
the fact that they link identification with Europe to the subjective perception of the 
                                               
2 In a similar study, Perucca (2019) analyses the influence of CP on the imbalance between 
country and European identity, concluding that the intensity of funding is not among the most 
important determinants of the preference for the country over Europe. 
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benefits of EU funding, concluding that the higher the perceived benefits, the stronger the 
European identity. 
Like Borz et al. (2018), we agree that support for the EU is greater from people who 
perceive the personal benefits of the CP. Therefore, we expect to see a gap in support in 
the raw data. However, our hypothesis is that much of the effect of the perception of the 
benefit on support corresponds to the effect of individual characteristics that vary between 
those people who perceive and do not perceive the benefits of the CP. In addition, we 
consider the possibility that the association between both variables is due to the fact that 
the people who most support the EU tend to perceive its policies more positively. In order 
to disentangle this reverse causality, we exploit the assumption that the intensity of the 
CP in the region has no direct effect on support. In this case, its only effect would be 
indirect; that is, EU funds in the region would have an impact on the perception of the 
benefits of the policy, which, in turn, could stimulate support for the EU. Accordingly, 
once accounting for individual characteristics and reverse causality, we expect a moderate 
gap, if any, in support. 
Our study differs from Borz et al. (2018) in some important respects. Firstly, their study 
uses data from a survey carried out in 17 regions of 12 EU member states, whereas the 
data used in our study covers all regions of 15 member states. Secondly, our interest is in 
the impact on support for the EU, not in European identity. Finally, we address the reverse 
causality by instrumenting the subjective perception of the CP with the intensity of the 
policy in the region. Therefore, our work complements rather than overlaps preceding 
evidence. 
To test our hypothesis, we specify a recursive bivariate probit that accounts for the 
endogeneity of the perception of the personal benefit of the policy. Our results show a 
high and significant raw association between the personal benefit of the CP and the 
support for the EU. However, this relationship decreases considerably once the 
confounding factors are taken into account, and in the end, once we control the reverse 
causality, we do not find any causal effect at all. On the other hand, the evidence confirms 
that, as expected, the subjective perception of the CP increases with the intensity of the 
policy in the region. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the individual and 
aggregate data used in the study and provides initial descriptive evidence. The empirical 
strategy to test the hypothesis of interest is discussed in section 3, while the results are 
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discussed in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes. Complementary results are reported 
in the Online Supplemental Material. 
2. Data set and descriptive analysis 
The empirical exercise in this paper assesses the impact of the citizens’ perception of the 
EU CP on their support for the European project. For this purpose, information for both 
aspects is required from a representative sample of individuals. Unfortunately, this 
information is not available in the Eurobarometer surveys since the standard ones that 
include the questions that enable the computation of indicators of the citizens’ support 
for the EU do not ask about the perception of the CP. In turn, the Flash Eurobarometer 
surveys that compile information about the latter aspect (awareness of regional policy in 
the EU) do not include questions about the degree of support for the European project. 
To fill this gap, the PERCEIVE project carried out a unique survey that provided 
information about both citizens’ support for the EU and their perception of the CP (see 
Charron and Bauhr, 2019; Bauhr and Charron, 2019). In all, 17,147 interviews were 
carried out during the summer of 2017 in 15 EU member states.3 The surveyed countries 
were selected on the basis of variation in terms of geography, size and institutional 
quality. Their population represents over 85% of the EU population. 
In addition to the responses about the perception of the CP and support for the EU, the 
PERCEIVE survey includes information on the different dimensions and mechanisms 
suggested in the literature about the formation of a European identity and the citizens’ 
support for the European integration process, as well as detailed information about the 
individuals’ personal and socio-economic characteristics. Interestingly, the database adds 
an identifier of the NUTS region (up to the third level) in which the respondents lived4, 
which allows the individual responses from the PERCEIVE survey to be merged with the 
                                               
3 The countries and number of respondents, in parenthesis, are Austria (1000), Bulgaria (503), 
Estonia (500), France (1500), Germany (1500), Hungary (1000), Italy (2000), Latvia (500), the 
Netherlands (500), Poland (2000), Romania (1015), Slovakia (1014), Spain (2014), Sweden 
(580), and UK (1500). One region in Austria, Romania, Spain, Sweden and the UK and two 
regions in Italy and Poland were oversampled due to specific analyses carried out by the 
PERCEIVE project. See Charron and Bauhr (2019) for details.  
4 NUTS, the acronym (in French) of nomenclature of territorial units for statistics, is a 
geographical nomenclature subdividing the economic territory of the EU into regions at three 
levels, NUTS 1 to 3 from larger to smaller territorial units. 
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data about an indicator of the intensity of the CP in the region, and with other region’s 
and country’s controls. 
The final sample used in this study excluded observations with missing values in any of 
the variables included in the empirical specifications used to estimate the impact of the 
perception of the benefits of the CP on support for the EU. This was the case for 2,314 
respondents (13.5% of the total sample). In other words, the sample used in the empirical 
analysis included 14,833 respondents. 
The PERCEIVE survey asked the citizens about their perception of the EU CP through 
different questions. As pointed out by Bauhr and Charron (2019), measuring awareness 
and public support for this policy is far more difficult than in the case of other policy 
areas. The survey included a first set of questions about knowledge of the CP. 
Interviewees were asked whether they have ever heard about the policy, using its 
alternative labels (Cohesion Policy / Regional Policy / Structural Funds). This 
information was complemented with that of the responses to a more general question 
related to their having ever heard about any EU-funded project in the region or area in 
which the individual lived. Although the responses to these questions allow a picture of 
the citizens’ awareness of the CP to be obtained, they do not necessarily contain 
information about the direct impact of the policy on individuals. In other words, a citizen 
of the EU can be aware of the existence of the CP without having benefited from it. Since 
in this study we are interested in testing whether individuals who obtain a personal benefit 
from the policy are more prone to support the EU, indicators based on awareness can 
produce flawed results. The questionnaire also included a question about the perception 
of the personal impact of the policy: 
To your knowledge, have you ever benefited in your daily life from any project 
funded by the EU? 
Respondents had to choose one among three options: Yes, No, or Don’t know, where the 
last one also included those who refused to answer the question. We assume that the 
individuals who responded positively were not only aware of the policy but also realized 
that it had a positive effect on their everyday lives. It might be the case that some 
individuals had benefited in their daily life from projects funded by the EU through policy 
interventions other than the ones included under the umbrella of the CP. However, due to 
the type of projects funded by the CP and the other EU programmes, we believe that the 
real influence of the latter in the responses to this question can be considered as marginal. 
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Besides, it should be kept in mind that before responding to this question, interviewees 
answered the questions related to their knowledge and awareness of the EU CP. 
The answers to the question were recoded as a dichotomous variable, 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑃, which 
distinguishes between respondents who claimed to have benefited from any project 
funded by the EU (i.e. answered Yes) and those who did not, or did not know.5 Based on 
the figures from the sample, it can be said that about one-third of the population in the 15 
EU member states considered in the survey declared they had benefited in a direct way 
from the CP (first column of results in Table 1). 
As in previous studies (e.g. Verhaegen et al., 2014; Dellmuth and Chalmers, 2018), we 
use the responses to the following question included in the PERCEIVE survey 
questionnaire as the indicator of citizens’ support for the EU:6 
In general, do you think that (YOUR COUNTRY’S) EU membership is: a good 
thing; a bad thing; neither good nor bad; not sure 
In line with previous studies (e.g. Clements, 2011; Serricchio et al., 2013), the answers 
were recoded in a dichotomous variable, 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐸𝑈: individuals were assumed to 
support the EU if they responded that their country’s membership of the EU was a good 
thing; otherwise it was assumed that they did not support the EU. It should be noted that 
this question was not asked to UK respondents because of the situation after the outcome 
of the Brexit referendum. To avoid losing information from the UK citizens, we appended 
the answers to a question only included in the UK questionnaire: 
If the BREXIT referendum were held today, how would you vote? 
The respondents selected from among the following options: Remain / Leave / Didn’t vote 
/ Refused. We assumed that those who responded Remain think that the UK’s membership 
of the EU was a good thing and, therefore, that they supported the EU. 
Overall, as can be observed in Table 1, about 60% of the respondents supported the EU. 
This is consistent with the figures about support for the EU in the Eurobarometer surveys 
of 2017 and 2018. The percentage of supporters of the EU project in the sample as a 
whole obscures significant differences between the people who benefited and did not 
                                               
5 The main results are robust to the exclusion from the sample of the Don’t know / Refused 
responses. They are 2.3% of the total sample and 1.8% of the considered sample. 
6 A similar question is included in the Eurobarometer survey to proxy for the citizens’ support for 
the EU. 
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benefit from the policy. Three out of four EU citizens who claimed to have benefited 
directly from the CP supported the EU project, whereas the percentage is slightly above 
50% for those who did not benefit personally. This evidence would confirm that 
individuals who benefited from the CP in their daily lives are more prone to support the 
EU. 
However, the positive association between benefiting from the policy and the citizens’ 
support for the EU could be due (at least in part) to characteristics of the individuals that 
affect both the perception of the policy and the attachment to the European project. As 
mentioned above, the database used in this paper includes detailed information about the 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics that can be used to control for these 
factors. Considering the arguments in the extant literature outlined in the previous section, 
they are grouped in the following categories: Utilitarian/economic egocentric 
mechanisms (Occupation, Income level, Perception of the economic situation in the 
region – current and future); Political ideology (More restriction on immigration, Support 
to redistribution, Preference for a strong leader); Political awareness/Cognitive 
mobilization (Education, Vote in European elections); Communal identity (Christian 
religion, Share common European history and culture, Identification with country and 
with region); Political-institutional factors (EU effectiveness, Corruption in the EU), and 
Demographic characteristics (Gender, Age, City size). As an additional control, we 
computed an indicator of the match between the needs in the region and the CP thematic 
objectives. This is based on the respondents’ perception of the most important problem 
in the region and the list of thematic objectives of the CP in the 2007−2013 period.7 Table 
2 lists the variables with their corresponding categories and descriptive statistics. The last 
two columns include the figures corresponding to the subsamples of individuals that 
benefited and did not benefit from the CP. The two groups of respondents differ in several 
respects, including income level, education, perception of immigrants, preference for a 
strong leader, participation in European elections, and the perception of the economic 
situation in the region. As mentioned in the previous section, there is wide evidence on 
the influence of these individual characteristics on support for the European integration 
project.  
                                               
7 Details on these variables, including the questions of the PERCEIVE survey and the categories 
and range of values, are provided in Table A.1 of the Appendix. 
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Besides individual-level characteristics, the study also considers several indicators at the 
regional and country levels. On the one hand, the intensity of the CP in the region is 
considered as a factor that determines the propensity to personally benefit from the policy 
but does not have a further direct effect on the support for the EU. It is proxied by the 
yearly average of the 2007−2013 programming period of the total annual structural fund 
expenditures in the region over the region’s total population of the corresponding year.8 
Table 1 shows the average of the structural fund expenditures per capita in the quartiles 
of its distribution in the set of European regions in the sample. It can clearly be observed 
how the intensity of the policy varies markedly between regions. The average in the 
regions with the lowest intensity is just €13.5 per capita, in sharp contrast with the €331.5 
that, on average, the less developed regions received. As expected, the percentage of 
citizens that benefited personally from the policy increases with the amount of structural 
funds expended in the region. The descriptive figures suggest a strong association 
between the intensity of the policy and the perception of personally benefiting from it: 
the percentage of people who benefited from the CP in regions that received the highest 
amount of structural funds per capita is three times the figure of those regions with the 
lowest intensity of the policy. Interestingly, the difference in the percentage of support 
for the EU between regions that received different amounts of structural funds is less 
obvious. This would support our assumption that the intensity of the policy would not 
have a direct effect on citizens’ support for the EU. This is confirmed by the information 
reported in Panel B of Table 1, where the percentage of the population that supports the 
EU is computed separately for the quartiles of the structural funds per capita and the 
groups of individuals who benefited and did not benefit from the policy. In neither of the 
two groups does support increase with the amount of EU funds in the region. 
Several region- and country-level controls are considered in the analysis. The first group 
includes the region’s employment rate, the level of GDP per inhabitant (in purchasing 
power standard as percentage of the EU average) and the percentage of the region’s 
population aged 25−64 years old whose highest level of education successfully completed 
is ‘Tertiary education’ (highly skilled individuals). The country-level controls are the net 
contribution of the country to the EU budget (as percentage of its GDP), the ratio of intra-
EU to the extra-EU exports, the inflation rate, membership of the Eurozone, the spread 
                                               
8 This data is made available by the European Commission DG Regional Policy in the webpage 
“Data for Research” (https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/evaluations/data-for-
research/). 
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of government bonds, and the number of years since accession to the EU. All these 
variables are measured in 2016 and come from Eurostat and other official European 
sources. 
3. Empirical model 
To estimate the effect of having benefited personally from the CP on the propensity to 
support the EU we specify the following empirical model: 
𝑃(𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐸𝑈)2(3)∗ = 𝛽7 · 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑃2(3) + 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝟏2(3)> · 𝚪7 + 𝑹𝒆𝒈_𝑪𝒐𝒖2> · 𝚿7 + 𝜀12(3) (1) 
where 𝑃(𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐸𝑈)2(3)∗  denotes the probability that an individual i in region r supports 
the EU, and 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑃2(3) is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 when this individual 
declared that they had benefited from the CP, and 0 otherwise. The parameter of interest 
for the study, 𝛽7, captures the difference in the probability of supporting the EU between 
individuals that benefited and did not benefit from the policy. If individuals that benefit 
personally from the CP are more prone to support the EU, 𝛽7 will be positive and 
statistically significant.9 The set of individual controls for respondent i in region r is 
included in the row vector 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝟏2(3)> , whereas 𝑹𝒆𝒈_𝑪𝒐𝒖2>  includes the controls for the 
region-country where the respondent i lived, 𝚪7 and 𝚿7 being the corresponding vectors 
of parameters. The inclusion of these controls is crucial for the identification of the net 
effect of having benefited personally from the CP in the support for the EU, since it can 
be argued that the mechanisms that determine the awareness of the CP, and the benefits 
it provokes in the region in general, and in each individual in particular, are not 
independent of those that affect the support for the EU.   
Nevertheless, unless the individual and region-country covariates completely control the 
influence of these mechanisms, the estimate of 𝛽7 from (1) could be biased, since it would 
include the effect of unobservable characteristics that influence both support for the EU 
and the perception of the personal benefit of the CP. In addition, the estimate of 𝛽7 might 
capture not only the impact of the benefit on the support, but also the opposite effect. This 
                                               
9 In this study, it is assumed that the effect of benefiting from CP on support for the EU is uniform 
across all individuals and regions. However, as stressed by Mols et al. (2009), European 
identification is context- and inter-group-dependent. Although we acknowledge that the effect of 
interest in this study can vary between population groups (e.g. winners and losers of the 
integration process) and across places (e.g. the link could be weaker in Eurosceptic countries and 
regions), the analysis of these types of heterogeneities is beyond the scope of this paper. We thank 
an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this issue.  
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is likely to be the case if the citizens who are most likely to support the European project 
are also more prone to have a positive perception of the CP, both in terms of awareness 
and in the perception of the personal benefits of the projects in the region financed by the 
policy. In either case, it could not be claimed that the estimate of 𝛽7 from (1) corresponds 
to the causal impact of the personal benefit of the CP on the citizens’ support for the EU. 
To take into account the pernicious effect of unobservables that can affect the two 
variables of interest and to mitigate the problem of reverse causality, a probabilistic model 
for the benefit variable is also specified as follows: 
𝑃(𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑃)2(3)∗ = 𝛽J · 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝐹𝑝𝑐)2 + 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝟐2(3)> · 𝚪J + 𝑹𝒆𝒈_𝑪𝒐𝒖2> · 𝚿J + 𝜀22(3) (2) 
where 𝑃(𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑃)2(3)∗  denotes the probability that an individual i in region r had 
benefited personally from the policy, 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝐹𝑝𝑐)2 is the indicator of the intensity of the 
CP in the region, and 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝟐2(3)>  is a vector of individual controls. In this specification, it is 
expected that 𝛽J > 0, indicating that the stronger the intensity of the policy in the region, 
the higher the chance that individuals in the region benefited personally by a CP-funded 
project.  
Although 𝑃(𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐸𝑈)2(3)∗  and 𝑃(𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑃)2(3)∗  are not observed, under the assumption 
of normality of 𝜀12(3) and 𝜀22(3) the coefficients of interest can be estimated from the 
corresponding univariate probit models when CovV𝜀12(3), 𝜀22(3)X = 𝜌 = 0. It is worth 
noting that if there were no correlation between the error terms of the two equations, the 
𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑃 variable would be exogenous in the empirical model and its effect on support 
for the EU could be estimated consistently from the univariate probit model. Conversely, 
if CovV𝜀12(3), 𝜀22(3)X = 𝜌 ≠ 0, the estimate of 𝛽7 from the univariate probit model would 
not provide a consistent estimate of the effect of the benefit on support. As mentioned 
above, the errors of the two equations will correlate if they absorb the effect of 
unobservables affecting the two variables under analysis. Therefore, we will estimate the 
recursive bivariate probit model, accounting for the correlation between the errors of 
equation (1) and (2). In this way it is possible to identify consistently the causal effect of 
the perception of the personal benefit of the policy on the support for the EU. In addition, 
the estimate of 𝛽J will allow us to assess how the probability of personally benefiting 
from the CP evolves with its intensity in the region, net of the effect of the other 
covariates. 
 11 
The exclusion of 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝐹𝑝𝑐)2 in the specification of the support for the EU (equation 1) is 
motivated by the assumption that, once conditioned on the individual characteristics, the 
only channel through which the policy affects the individual’s support for the EU is 
through its impact on the perception of personal benefit. To be clear, it is assumed that 
the information that people have about the intensity of the CP in the region is (at best) 
rather vague. As a result, when they decide on the degree of support for the EU, they do 
not make a conscious connection with the amount of EU funds allocated in the region. 
However, it is sensible to think that people living in regions where large amounts of CP 
funds are allocated are more aware of EU-funded projects in the region than similar 
people in places that receive less investment. Similarly, we can expect more people to 
benefit in their daily lives from CP-funded projects in highly recipient regions. It is the 
greater perception of benefiting from EU interventions in these regions that can encourage 
support for the EU among their citizens. In other words, our hypothesis is that the impact 
of the CP on the citizens’ support for the EU is channelled through this indirect 
mechanism. 
The fact that the distribution of the CP funds among the EU regions for the period 
2007−2013 was decided several years before the PERCEIVE survey was carried out and, 
therefore, well before the perception of the policy and support for the EU were measured, 
works in favour of the exogeneity of  𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝐹𝑝𝑐)2. For this assumption to hold, it is also 
crucial that the criteria used to allocate the funds in the different countries and regions 
were based on objective rules (the relative level of per capita GDP in the region) that did 
not include the degree of support for the EU of their citizens and/or their perception of 
the CP (see Osterloh, 2011 and Dellmuth and Chalmers, 2018 for similar arguments). 
Likewise, the evidence in Bouvet and Dall’erba (2010) confirms that Euroscepticism and 
the citizens’ attitudes towards the EU do not exert a significant effect on the distribution 
of structural funds across countries and regions. 
It should also be noted that the match between the perceived needs in the region and the 
CP thematic objectives is assumed to affect the propensity to perceive a personal benefit 
of the CP but not the support for the EU. Accordingly, this variable is not included in 
Ind1 of equation (1). Conversely, the perception of the economic situation of the region 
and the communal identity and political−institutional indicators are not included in Ind2 
because they are assumed to impact only support for the EU. 
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Finally, it is worth mentioning that the errors of the individuals living in the same region 
are expected to correlate with each other. A mixed-effect model that accounts for this 
type of correlation in the errors has been considered in previous studies (e.g. Verhaegen 
et al., 2014). Alternatively, the robust region-clustered standard errors of the estimated 
coefficients can be computed to account for this correlation, in the context of the bivariate 
probit model (e.g. Osterloh, 2011; Serricchio et al., 2013). In this study we have opted 
for the latter option. 
4. Results 
This section discusses the results of the estimation of the impact of the perception of the 
personal benefit of the CP on the citizens’ support for the EU from the empirical model 
discussed in the previous section. To facilitate the interpretation of the size of the effects 
of interest, the figures in all the tables of this section are the average marginal effects 
(AMEs) associated with the estimate of the corresponding coefficients.10 
In the first place, the univariate probit model for the support for the EU in equation (1) is 
estimated as a sort of baseline specification. The results are reported in Table 3.11 The 
first column corresponds to the simplest specification that only includes the 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑃 
variable. Columns (ii) and (iii) subsequently add the individual and region-country 
controls. It is clearly observed that the omission of the control variables biases upward 
the estimated impact of 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑃. The estimated effect in the simplest specification in 
column (i) indicates that, on average, the propensity to support the EU of people who 
declared that they personally benefited from the policy is 20.4 percentage points (p.p.) 
higher than that of the people who did not. This raw difference, which was already 
reported in Table 1, is one-third of the overall percentage of citizens who declared that 
they supported the EU. 
Interestingly, the estimates in columns (ii) and (iii) confirm that a great deal of this gap 
in support between respondents who benefited and did not benefit from the CP is 
attributable to differences among them in individual and region-country characteristics. 
To be clear, not controlling for the mechanisms and determinants that affect the 
propensity of individuals to support the EU leads to confounding the estimate of the effect 
                                               
10 The sample weights available in the PERCEIVE survey have been used to obtain all the results 
in this section. 
11 The detailed results of the regressions in this section are available in the Online Supplementary 
Material (Tables SM1 to SM3). 
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of having benefited from the policy. The difference net of the influence of the observed 
individual controls shrinks to 6.9 p.p. (column ii), whereas the inclusion of the aggregate 
determinants decreases the gap slightly to 6.4 p.p. (column iii). In any case, the impact of 
the personal benefit remains significant from a statistical point of view in the two 
extended specifications. Taking into account that 61% of individuals supported the 
European project, the size of the impact of the benefit of the CP can be considered as 
moderate (it represents around 10% of the support for the EU). 
The last column of Table 3 includes the indicator of the intensity of the CP as an additional 
direct determinant of the probability of support for the EU. This can be considered as a 
sort of test of the assumption that the amount of Structural Fund expenditures per capita 
in the region does not exert an effect on support beyond that channelled through its impact 
on the perception of personal benefit. As can be seen in column (iv), the estimated impact 
of the 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑃 variable remains unchanged and, what is more important, there is no 
significant direct effect of the intensity of the policy on support. In other words, this result 
supports the validity of our exclusion restriction, i.e. the lack of a direct effect of the 
intensity of the CP on support for the EU.  
To tackle the endogeneity of the 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑃 variable we estimated the effects of interest 
from the recursive bivariate probit model introduced in the previous section. The 
estimated AMEs are summarized in Table 4. The first column of results corresponds to 
the effect of the indicator of the intensity of the CP on the perception of the benefit of the 
policy, while the estimated AME of this variable on the support for the EU is reported in 
the second column.12 In the first place, it is observed that the indicator of the intensity of 
the CP in the region exerts a significant sizeable effect on the probability of having 
benefited personally from the policy. An increase of 10% in the amount of Structural 
Fund expenditures per capita in the region increases the probability of reporting a 
personal benefit by around 0.7 p.p. This is an important effect if one considers the large 
regional variation in the CP expenditures per capita (see the figures reported in Table 1) 
and that only a third of the population in the surveyed countries declared they had 
benefited from the CP.13 
                                               
12 The results of the bivariate probit model that does not include the control variables are not 
reported to save space. They are available upon request. 
13 The univariate probit model for the benefit from the Cohesion Policy reports similar results on 
the effect of the amount of Structural Funds per capita in the region. The results for this model 
are summarized in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
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Interestingly, the results in the second column of Table 4 point to a non-significant effect 
of benefiting from the policy on the propensity to support the European project. This is 
in sharp contrast with the positive and significant effect obtained from the univariate 
probit specification. In fact, the positive estimate of the effect in the univariate probit 
discussed above may be due to the fact that citizens who are more prone to support the 
EU have a more positive perception of the effect of the CP and, as a result, tend to declare 
that the projects financed by the EU have benefited them in their daily lives. When this 
source of reverse causality is controlled in the recursive bivariate probit model,14 the 
evidence no longer supports the existence of a causal effect of benefiting from the CP in 
supporting the EU. As a consequence, the significant and sizeable effect of the intensity 
of the policy on the perception of its benefits does not translate into greater support for 
the EU. 
Nevertheless, our conclusions can be questioned based on the result of the Wald test of 
the hypothesis that CovV𝜀12(3), 𝜀22(3)X = 𝜌 = 0, reported at the bottom of Table 4. The 
result of this test leads to the exogeneity of 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑃 not being rejected and, therefore, 
suggests that the univariate probit model for support for the EU (equation 3) provides a 
consistent estimate of the effect of interest. However, this result should be read with 
caution for two reasons. Firstly, Monfardini and Radice (2008) showed that in the context 
of the recursive bivariate probit model, a likelihood ratio test (LR) is preferred over a 
Wald test to check for endogeneity, due to the poor performance of the latter test. 
Secondly, the LR test should not be used when, as in our empirical exercise, sample 
weights and/or robust-clustered errors are considered.15 For this reason, we re-estimated 
the bivariate probit model without weighting and without using the robust-cluster option. 
In this case, the LR test equals 6.3 with a p-value of 0.01, which leads to doubt about the 
exogeneity of 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑃 (results are reported in Table SM4 of the Online Supplemental 
Material). This is confirmed by an alternative test of the exogeneity of 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑃, based 
on Rivers and Voung (1988), whose result clearly points to the endogeneity of this 
variable.16 
                                               
14 The identification in the recursive bivariate probit also relies on the exclusion of some of the 
individual determinants in the 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑃 equation. In any case, the main conclusion of our study 
is robust to the inclusion of these variables in both equations. 
15 The ‘likelihood’ is not a true likelihood in this case. 
16 To implement this test, in a first stage we computed the generalized residuals from the probit 
model of the benefit variable on the Structural Funds per capita and the control variables. In a 
second stage, the univariate probit model for the support variable was extended with the first-
 15 
Finally, the estimated effects of the individual and region-country controls are reported 
in Table SM2 of the Online Supplemental Material. It is observed that the probability of 
perceiving personal benefits from the CP increases with the income and education levels, 
and it is higher for those interested in European politics (as proxied by voting in the 
European elections) and for individuals who reported one of the thematic objectives of 
the CP as the biggest problem that their regions faced in the recent years (Match needs 
region – CP thematic obj.). By contrast, this probability is lower among those who 
believed that their countries should have more restrictions on immigration, and among 
individuals who think that their countries would benefit from having a strong leader who 
can solve problems quickly, without having to worry about elections and parliamentary 
rules. The probability is also a bit lower among females and those living in small towns. 
Regarding the effect of the aggregate controls, the only regional determinant with a 
significant effect is the endowment of skills. The results suggest that similar individuals 
living in regions with a higher percentage of highly educated population tend to have a 
greater probability of perceiving the personal benefits of the CP. More country controls 
seem to have a significant effect on this probability. This is smaller for people in countries 
that are net donors to the EU budget, members of the Eurozone, and older members of 
the EU. Conversely, it is greater in countries for which the EU market is an important 
destination of their exports. 
As regards the impact of the control variables on the propensity to support the EU, it is 
observed that there are no significant differences among individuals of different ages and 
gender. However, support varies across occupations and income levels. For example, with 
respect to employees in the public sector, those in the private sector seem to be more 
supportive of the European project. Support is also higher among students and trainees. 
By contrast, there are no differences between public sector employees and, for example, 
the unemployed and pensioners. Similarly, support increases with the level of income 
declared by the individual. Interestingly, other things being equal, individuals who have 
a more positive perception of the current and future economic situation in the region are 
more prone to support the EU. This is consistent with the utilitarian economic arguments 
and the differences in support between winners and losers of the European integration 
process. The results are also consistent with the hypotheses of political awareness, 
                                               
stage generalized residuals. The Wald test of the significance of these residuals is a test of the 
exogeneity of 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑃. The test statistic reported a value of 6.75 with an associated p-value 
of 0.01. 
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cognitive mobilization, and communal identity. On the one hand, the propensity to 
support the EU is significantly higher among the highly educated individuals and those 
who participated consistently in the European elections. On the other, support is lower 
among citizens who considered that the Christian religion is an important element of the 
identification with Europe and among those who do not feel that having a common history 
and culture is important in that respect. It is also observed that a higher identification with 
the country is associated with a higher probability of support for the EU. 
The political ideology of the respondents also exerted a significant effect. Specifically, 
the probability of support is higher for those who agreed with the principle of 
redistribution, whereas it is lower among individuals who thought that their countries 
should put more restrictions on immigration and wanted a strong leader who can solve 
problems quickly, without worrying about the democratic mechanism. On the other hand, 
support for the EU is significantly higher among individuals who perceived that the EU 
is effective in dealing with the biggest problem in their regions, whereas it decreases with 
the perception that corruption is widespread in the EU. 
With regard to the aggregate controls, it is observed that the effect of the regional ones is 
negligible in all cases. This means that after controlling for the influence of the individual 
characteristics, there are no regional differences in support that can be explained by 
differences in the employment rates, income per capita, and the endowment of skills in 
the region. On the contrary, some country-level determinants seem to have a significant 
effect. To be clear, the probability of support for the EU decreases with the net 
contribution to the EU budget, the inflation rate, and the years since the accession to the 
EU. Overall, this could be capturing the higher support for the EU in the poorest member 
states that joined the EU in the recent enlargements and, to some extent, differences across 
countries in the degree of Euroscepticism among their populations. 
5. Conclusions 
This study provides, for the first time, evidence on the impact of the perception of the 
subjective benefits of the CP on mass support for the EU, using information from a novel 
survey that combines questions regarding these two aspects. The results suggest that the 
positive gap in support between individuals who declared and did not declare that they 
personally benefited from the policy should not be attributed to a causal effect of the 
perception of the subjective benefit on support. This is so since most of the correlation 
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between the two variables is explained by the individual characteristics that affect both 
the perception of the benefits and the support. In addition, the evidence obtained in this 
study suggests that the raw association between the two variables is probably explained 
by the fact that the people who most support the EU tend to have a greater perception of 
the subjective benefits of the CP. 
On the other hand, the results indicate that the intensity of the Cohesion Policy in the 
region does not stimulate support for the EU, either in a direct or in an indirect way. 
Although the perception of the subjective benefit increases with the amount of EU funds 
received in the region, the lack of impact of the perception of the benefit on support 
prevents a transmission of the effect of the intensity of the policy to this latter variable. 
Among other implications, this raises doubts about the effectiveness of the mechanisms 
of the communication of the Cohesion Policy. On the one hand, awareness and 
particularly perception of the personal benefit of the policy is not especially high, even in 
the regions that receive the largest amounts of EU funds. On the other, and most 
importantly, it could be failing in building the bridge between the citizens’ perception of 
the policy and their support for the European project. As stated by (Molica and Salvai, 
2019) when discussing the CP, ‘public communication is currently confronted by 
enormous challenges’ (p. 10). In any case, it must be stressed that, up to now, the CP has 
not had among its declared objectives the strengthening of the identification of citizens 
with the European integration project. 
Finally, it should be acknowledged that this study has not considered differences in the 
effects of interest between population groups (e.g. winners and losers of the EU 
integration) and types of regions. For example, it could be argued that the causal effect 
of policy benefits on support exists only for individuals with a given degree of education 
and political awareness. Similarly, it can be argued that this effect varies between 
Eurosceptic and non-Eurosceptic regions. A significant positive effect of benefiting from 
the Cohesion Policy on support for the EU may be more likely to exist in the pro-EU 
regions. Although the exploration of these sources of heterogeneity is beyond the scope 
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Table 1. Benefit from the Cohesion Policy and Support to the EU. 
 
PANEL A 
 Benefit CP  Support EU 
Full sample 32.61 61.04 
   
Benefit CP   
NO  54.49 
YES  74.57 
   
Structural Fund exp. pc   
Q1 (13.48) 18.30 56.17 
Q2 (42.28) 22.91 62.98 
Q3 (163.13) 32.81 61.64 
Q4 (331.50) 54.76 64.52 
   
 
PANEL B   Support to the EU (%) by perception and intensity of the CP 
   
 Benefit CP 
 NO YES 
Structural Fund exp. pc   
Q1 (13.48) 51.52 76.95 
Q2 (42.28) 59.30 75.37 
Q3 (163.13) 55.02 75.21 
Q4 (331.50) 52.51 74.44 
Notes: Computed from the sample used in the estimations (14,833 observations). 
Figures are weighted proportions in the sample (in %) using the sample weights in 
the PERCEIVE survey. CP refers to Cohesion Policy. Q1 to Q4 denote the quartiles 
of the distribution of Structural Fund expenditures per capita in the region. The 
average amount in each quartile (in €) is reported in parenthesis.  
 
Table 2. Description of individual characteristics. 
 





UTILITARIAN / ECONOMIC MECHANISMS    
Occupation (Employed public sector)    
  Employed private sector 0.26 0.25 0.28 
  Self employed 0.11 0.10 0.13 
  Unemployed 0.06 0.07 0.05 
  Housewife / Houseman 0.04 0.05 0.03 
  Pensioner, retired 0.26 0.29 0.21 
  Student / Trainee 0.04 0.04 0.04 
  Other 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Income level (Low)    
  Medium 0.31 0.31 0.30 
  High 0.39 0.34 0.49 
Perception economic situation in region (Very unsatisfied)   
  Somewhat unsatisfied 0.30 0.30 0.28 
  Somewhat satisfied 0.47 0.45 0.52 
  Very satisfied 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Perception evolution economic situation in region (Worse)   
  About the same 0.43 0.46 0.38 
  Better 0.31 0.26 0.43 
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY    
More restrictions immigration 5.9 6.3 5.2 
Support redistribution 7.7 7.7 7.9 
Strong leader 6.2 6.4 5.8 
POLITICAL AWARENESS / COGNITIVE MOBILIZATION   
Education (Less than secondary)    
  Secondary 0.36 0.39 0.32 
  University 0.30 0.28 0.34 
  Post graduate 0.14 0.10 0.21 
Vote 2009 and 2014 EU elections (Neither)    
  Once 0.17 0.16 0.17 
  Both times 0.51 0.49 0.57 
COMMUNAL IDENTITY    
Importance in terms of being European of:   
  Christian religion 5.6 5.5 5.6 
  Common history and culture 6.4 6.2 7.0 
Degree identification with:    
  Country 7.5 7.2 8.0 
  Region 6.8 6.6 7.3 
POLITICAL / INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS    
EU effectiveness (Not so effective)    
  Somewhat effective 0.36 0.33 0.42 
  Very effective 0.12 0.10 0.15 
Corruption in EU 6.3 6.4 6.0 
CORRESPONDENCE PERSONAL & CP AIMS    
Match needs region - CP thematic obj. 0.30 0.28 0.33 
DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS    
Age 49.5 50.3 47.6 
Female (Male) 0.50 0.51 0.47 
City size (Rural)    
  Small town 0.39 0.41 0.35 
  Large city 0.21 0.19 0.24 
  Very large city 0.08 0.07 0.09 
    
Observations 14833 10089 4744 
Notes: Weighted proportions for Occupation, Income level, Perception of economic situation (and its evolution) in 
the region, Education, Vote EU elections, EU effectiveness, Match needs region – CP thematic obj., Female, and 
City size. Reference categories used in the empirical specifications in parenthesis. Weighted averages for the other 
variables. Age is in years. For the other variables, responses run from 0 to 10. Sample weights in the PERCEIVE 
survey were used in all cases. 
 
Table 3. Effect of the personal benefit of the Cohesion Policy on citizens’ support for 
the EU. Univariate probit model. 
 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Benefit CP 0.2038*** 0.0688*** 0.0638*** 0.0619***  
(0.0175) (0.0130) (0.0128) (0.0129) 
Structural Fund exp. pc (log) 
   
0.0186     
(0.0166) 
INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS 
    
   Utilitarian Mechanisms 
 
YES YES YES 
   Political Ideology 
 
YES YES YES 
   Political Awareness 
 
YES YES YES 
   Communal Identity 
 
YES YES YES 
   Political-Institutional factors 
 
YES YES YES 
Demographics 
 
YES YES YES   
   
REGIONAL CONTROLS     
 
NO YES YES 
COUNTRY CONTROLS 
 
NO YES YES 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Omitted categories 
as described in Table 2. The number of observations is 14,833 in all specifications. The variables for every 
category of individual controls are reported in Table 2. Regional controls and country controls as described in 




Table 4. Effect of the personal benefit of the Cohesion Policy on citizens’ 
support for the EU. Bivariate probit model. 
 





-0.0504   
(0.1054) 







Utilitarian Mechanisms   
Occupation YES YES 
Income Level YES YES 
Perception economic situation in the  
region 
NO YES 
Perception evolution economic 
situation  
in the region 
NO YES 
Political Ideology YES YES 
Political Awareness YES YES 
Communal Identity NO YES 
Political-Institutional factors NO YES 
Match between needs and CP    
  objectives 
YES NO 
Demographics YES YES 
   
COUNTRY CONTROLS YES YES 
REGION CONTROLS YES YES 
   
r 0.2192 
 (0.1908) 
Wald test r=0      1.24 
p-value Wald test 0.27 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The number of observations is 14,833 in all specifications. r denotes the correlation between 
the errors of the two equations. See notes in Table 3 for details on the individual and country 




Table A1. Details of variables corresponding to the individual characteristics. 
 
Variable Question Categories / Values 
Occupation 
Sequence of questions about employment 
situation, current status if not employee and 
sector of employment if employee. 
Employed public sector; 





Income level Please tell me your average total household net income per month (after taxes).   …. € Low; Medium; High 
Perception economic situation 
in region 
How satisfied are you with the current 
economic situation in your region today? 
Very unsatisfied; Somewhat 
unsatisfied; Somewhat satisfied; 
Very satisfied 
Perception evolution economic 
situation in the region 
Compared with (5 years ago), do you think 
the economy in your region is: Better; About 
the same; Worse 
Worse, About the same; Better 
More restrictions immigration Your country should have more restrictions on immigration than it does today 
0-Fully disagree to 10-Fully 
agree 
Support redistribution 
The national government should take 
measures to reduce differences in income 
levels among people in your country. 
 
0-Fully disagree to 10-Fully 
agree 
Strong leader 
Your country should have a strong leader 
that can solve problems quickly, who does 
not have to worry about elections and 
parliamentary rules. 
0-Fully disagree to 10-Fully 
agree 
Education Please tell me what is the highest level in school you have completed? 
Less than secondary; Secondary; 
University; Post graduate 
Vote 2009 and 2014 EU 
elections 
Have you voted in either of the last two EU 
parliamentary elections? Neither; Once; Both times  
Christian religion How important is the Christian religion to you in terms of ‘being European’? 
0-Not important at all to 10-Very 
important 
Common history and culture 
How important is sharing a common 
European history and culture to you in terms 
of ‘being European’? 
0-Not important at all to 10-Very 
important 
Identification with country How strongly you identify yourself with your country? 
0-Don’t identify at all to 10-
Identify very strongly 
Identification with region How strongly you identify yourself with your region? 
0-Don’t identify at all to 10-
Identify very strongly 
EU effectiveness 
How effective do you think the EU will be at 
dealing with the biggest 
problem in your region? 
Not so effective; Somewhat 
effective; Very effective 
Corruption in EU How would you rate the EU in term of corruption? 
0-There is no corruption to 10-
Corruption is widespread 
Match needs region – CP 
thematic objectives 
In the past 5 years or so, which of the 
following do you think has been the biggest 
problem facing your region? 
 
Combined with the thematic objectives of 
CP in period 2007-2013 
1: Main perceived problem in 
region is close to CP thematic 
objective (poor education, poor 
infrastructure & transportation, 
Environmental concerns; 0: 
Otherwise (Corruption and poor 
governance, Unemployment, Poor 
wages / poverty, Other 
Age Please tell me your age. Years 
Female Indicate gender of respondent. 1: Female; 0: Male 
City size About how many people live in the place the interview was conducted? 
Rural (<10K inhab.); Small town 
(10K-100K); Large city (100K-




Table A2. Effect of Structural Fund expenditures in the region on the personal 
benefit of the Cohesion Policy. Univariate probit model. 
 (i) (ii) (iii) 
Structural Fund exp. pc (log) 0.0990*** 0.1110*** 0.0726***  
(0.0104) (0.0090) (0.0174)     
INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS 
   
Utilitarian Mechanisms    
Occupation NO YES YES 
Income Level NO YES YES 
Perception economic situation in the  
region 
NO NO NO 
Perception evolution economic 
situation in the region 
NO NO NO 
Political Ideology NO YES YES 
Political Awareness NO YES YES 
Communal Identity NO NO NO 
Political-Institutional factors NO NO NO 
Match between needs and CP    
  objectives 
NO YES YES 
Demographics NO YES YES 
    
REGIONAL CONTROLS     NO NO YES 
COUNTRY CONTROLS NO NO YES 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The number of observations is 14,833 in all specifications. See notes in Table 3 for details 
on the individual and country and region controls. Results obtained using the sample weights 










Tables SM1 to SM3 report the estimated average marginal effects from the corresponding 
univariate and recursive bivariate probit specifications. They are the counterparts of the 
tables included in the main text of the paper. Table SM4 reports the results of the 
estimation of the bivariate probit model that does not use the sample weights and does 
not consider the clustered standard errors.
 
Table SM1. Estimated effects on citizens’ support for the EU from the univariate 
probit model. 
 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Benefit CP 0.2038*** 0.0688*** 0.0638*** 0.0619***  
(0.0175) (0.0130) (0.0128) (0.0129) 
Structural Fund exp. pc (log) 
   
0.0186     
(0.0166) 
INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS 
    
Age 
 
0.0024 0.0023 0.0023   
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
Age (sq.) 
 
-0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000   
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Female 
 
-0.0119 -0.0130 -0.0130   
(0.0096) (0.0097) (0.0096) 
Occupation 
    
  Employed private sector 
 
0.0338*** 0.0316** 0.0323**   
(0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0128) 
  Self employed 
 
0.0081 0.0045 0.0043   
(0.0158) (0.0156) (0.0156) 
  Unemployed 
 
-0.0140 -0.0069 -0.0070   
(0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0182) 
  Housewife / Houseman 
 
0.0142 0.0152 0.0148   
(0.0259) (0.0252) (0.0252) 
  Pensioner, retired 
 
0.0260 0.0259 0.0272   
(0.0178) (0.0174) (0.0173) 
  Student / Trainee 
 
0.0955*** 0.0958*** 0.0974***   
(0.0304) (0.0304) (0.0302) 
  Other 
 
-0.0067 0.0049 0.0041   
(0.0298) (0.0294) (0.0293) 
Income level 
    
  Medium 
 
0.0188 0.0221* 0.0215   
(0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0131) 
  High 
 
0.0581*** 0.0582*** 0.0587***   
(0.0146) (0.0155) (0.0156) 
Education 
    
  Secondary 
 
-0.0006 -0.0032 -0.0023   
(0.0145) (0.0141) (0.0141) 
  University 
 
0.0694*** 0.0663*** 0.0678***   
(0.0152) (0.0153) (0.0154) 
  Post graduate 
 
0.0954*** 0.0878*** 0.0884***   
(0.0195) (0.0202) (0.0203) 
More restrictions immigrants 
 
-0.0179*** -0.0173*** -0.0173***   
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
Support redistribution 
 
0.0064*** 0.0062*** 0.0061***   
(0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
Strong leader 
 
-0.0090*** -0.0082*** -0.0083***   
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0020) 
Vote EU elections 
    
  Once 
 
0.0132 0.0174 0.0169   
(0.0166) (0.0157) (0.0156) 
  Both times 
 
0.0377*** 0.0457*** 0.0459***   
(0.0127) (0.0118) (0.0118) 
 
 
Table SM1 (cont.). Estimated effects on citizens’ support for the EU from the 
univariate probit model. 
 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
 
Perception economic situation in region    
  Somewhat unsatisfied -0.0109 -0.0126 -0.0125   
(0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0162) 
  Somewhat satisfied 
 
0.0486*** 0.0398** 0.0402**   
(0.0154) (0.0164) (0.0164) 
  Very satisfied 
 
0.0945*** 0.0825*** 0.0814***   
(0.0245) (0.0254) (0.0256) 
Perception evolution economic situation in region 
  
  About the same 
 
0.0322*** 0.0356*** 0.0352***   
(0.0123) (0.0121) (0.0121) 
  Better 
 
0.0984*** 0.0958*** 0.0944***   
(0.0149) (0.0151) (0.0152) 
Importance in terms of being European of: 
   
  Christian religion 
 
-0.0042*** -0.0034** -0.0033**   
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
  Common history and culture 
 
0.0258*** 0.0268*** 0.0266***   
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) 
Degree identification with: 
    
  Country 
 
0.0158*** 0.0147*** 0.0146***   
(0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0029) 
  Region 
 
0.0048* 0.0046* 0.0046*   
(0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0026) 
EU effectiveness 
    
  Somewhat effective 
 
0.1156*** 0.1057*** 0.1058***   
(0.0128) (0.0122) (0.0122) 
  Very effective 
 
0.1965*** 0.1842*** 0.1853***   
(0.0206) (0.0202) (0.0200) 
Corruption in EU 
 
-0.0250*** -0.0246*** -0.0249***   
(0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0022) 
City size 
    
  Small town 
 
-0.0006 0.0008 0.0006   
(0.0132) (0.0130) (0.0131) 
  Large city 
 
-0.0050 -0.0106 -0.0113   
(0.0142) (0.0152) (0.0152) 
  Very large city 
 
0.0427** 0.0375* 0.0386*   
(0.0167) (0.0198) (0.0199) 
REGION/COUNTRY CONTROLS 
    
Employment rate 
  
0.0011 0.0023    
(0.0017) (0.0019) 
GDPpc (PPS as % EU average) 
  




0.0011 0.0007    
(0.0012) (0.0012) 
Net contribution EU budget (% GDP) 
  
-2.7103* -2.9203**    
(1.3946) (1.4445) 
Exports to EU 
  




-0.0499** -0.0534***    
(0.0199) (0.0203) 
Member of Eurozone 
  




-0.0103 -0.0120    
(0.0187) (0.0192) 
Years since accession 
  
-0.0020*** -0.0017***    
(0.0006) (0.0006) 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Omitted 
categories as described in Table 2. The number of observations is 14,833 in all specifications. Results 
obtained using the sample weights in the PERCEIVE survey. 
 
 
Table SM2. Estimated effects on the personal benefit of the CP and 
citizens’ support for the EU from the bivariate probit 
model. 
 





-0.0504   
(0.1054) 







Age -0.0008 0.0021  
(0.0019) (0.0018) 
Age (sq.) -0.0000 -0.0000  
(0.0000) (0.0000) 




  Employed private sector -0.0131 0.0297**  
(0.0112) (0.0127) 
  Self employed -0.0050 0.0045  
(0.0180) (0.0160) 
  Unemployed 0.0109 -0.0058  
(0.0231) (0.0187) 
  Housewife / Houseman -0.0198 0.0137  
(0.0290) (0.0249) 
  Pensioner, retired -0.0247 0.0223  
(0.0189) (0.0180) 
  Student / Trainee 0.0050 0.0949***  
(0.0300) (0.0305) 




  Medium 0.0438*** 0.0280*  
(0.0121) (0.0144) 




  Secondary 0.0434*** 0.0010  
(0.0152) (0.0154) 
  University 0.1086*** 0.0781***  
(0.0177) (0.0190) 
  Post graduate 0.1703*** 0.1070***  
(0.0201) (0.0263) 
More restrictions immigrants -0.0098*** -0.0186***  
(0.0015) (0.0021) 
Support redistribution 0.0039* 0.0066***  
(0.0021) (0.0020) 
Strong leader -0.0042** -0.0087***  
(0.0019) (0.0020) 
Vote EU elections 
  
  Once 0.0393*** 0.0225  
(0.0151) (0.0156) 




Table SM2 (cont.). Estimated effects on the personal benefit of the CP 
and citizens’ support for the EU from the bivariate 
probit model. 
 
 Benefit CP Support EU 
Perception economic situation in region 
 
  Somewhat unsatisfied 
 
-0.0123   
(0.0164) 
  Somewhat satisfied 
 
0.0396**   
(0.0164) 
  Very satisfied 
 
0.0826***   
(0.0251) 
Perception evolution economic situation in region 
 
  About the same 
 
0.0359***   
(0.0121) 
  Better 
 
0.0966***   
(0.0151) 
Importance in terms of being European of: 
 
  Christian religion 
 
-0.0033**   
(0.0015) 
  Common history and culture 
 
0.0269***   
(0.0020) 
Degree identification with: 
  
  Country 
 
0.0147***   
(0.0030) 
  Region 
 




  Somewhat effective 
 
0.1055***   
(0.0124) 
  Very effective 
 
0.1831***   
(0.0196) 
Corruption in EU 
 




  Small town -0.0229** -0.0012  
(0.0113) (0.0135) 
  Large city 0.0122 -0.0084  
(0.0130) (0.0152) 
  Very large city 0.0232 0.0397*  
(0.0238) (0.0205) 







Employment rate 0.0014 0.0007  
(0.0021) (0.0018) 
GDPpc (PPS as % EU average) 0.0002 -0.0000  
(0.0005) (0.0003) 
Skill endowment 0.0028** 0.0018  
(0.0012) (0.0013) 
Net contribution EU budget (% GDP) -5.0016*** -3.3373**  
(1.6747) (1.4580) 
Exports to EU 0.0004*** 0.0000  
(0.0001) (0.0001) 
Inflation rate -0.0240 -0.0523***  
(0.0303) (0.0188) 
Member of Eurozone -0.0857** -0.0052  
(0.0429) (0.0441) 
Spread 0.0137 -0.0053  
(0.0176) (0.0197) 
Years since accession -0.0022*** -0.0023***  
(0.0007) (0.0007) 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Omitted categories as described in Table 2. The number of observations is 14,833 in all 
specifications. Results obtained using the sample weight in the PERCEIVE survey. 
 
Table SM3. Effect of Structural Fund expenditures in the region on the 
personal benefit of the Cohesion Policy from the univariate 
probit model. 
 
 (i) (ii) (iii) 
Structural Fund exp. pc (log) 0.0990*** 0.1110*** 0.0726***  
(0.0104) (0.0090) (0.0174) 
INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS 
   
Age 
 








-0.0270*** -0.0294***   
(0.0097) (0.0098) 
Occupation 
   
  Employed private sector 
 
-0.0111 -0.0125   
(0.0119) (0.0111) 
  Self employed 
 
0.0053 -0.0047   
(0.0187) (0.0181) 
  Unemployed 
 
-0.0395* 0.0111   
(0.0231) (0.0230) 
  Housewife / Houseman 
 
-0.0447 -0.0182   
(0.0276) (0.0287) 
  Pensioner, retired 
 
-0.0206 -0.0261   
(0.0201) (0.0188) 
  Student / Trainee 
 
-0.0135 0.0066   
(0.0305) (0.0300) 
  Other 
 
0.0182 -0.0205   
(0.0313) (0.0279) 
Income level 
   
  Medium 
 
0.0461*** 0.0441***   
(0.0129) (0.0121) 
  High 
 
0.1234*** 0.1106***   
(0.0150) (0.0134) 
Education 
   
  Secondary 
 
0.0429*** 0.0443***   
(0.0145) (0.0152) 
  University 
 
0.1093*** 0.1093***   
(0.0183) (0.0176) 
  Post graduate 
 
0.1919*** 0.1708***   
(0.0209) (0.0202) 
More restrictions immigrants 
 








-0.0073*** -0.0041**   
(0.0019) (0.0020) 
Vote EU elections 
   
  Once 
 
0.0304* 0.0402***   
(0.0162) (0.0147) 
  Both times 
 
0.0604*** 0.0836*** 
  (0.0127) (0.0100) 
 
 
Table SM3 (cont.). Effect of Structural Fund expenditures in the region on the 




 (i) (ii) (iii) 
City size 
   
  Small town 
 
-0.0336*** -0.0222**   
(0.0123) (0.0113) 
  Large city 
 
0.0125 0.0125   
(0.0158) (0.0130) 
  Very large city 
 
0.0509 0.0240   
(0.0356) (0.0238) 
Match needs region - CP thematic obj. 
 
0.0529*** 0.0371***   
(0.0126) (0.0116) 
REGION/COUNTRY CONTROLS 
   
Employment rate 
  
0.0015    
(0.0021) 
GDPpc (PPS as % EU average) 
  




0.0027**    
(0.0011) 
Net contribution EU budget (% GDP) 
  
-5.0820***    
(1.6671) 
Exports to EU 
  




-0.0246    
(0.0303) 
Member of Eurozone 
  




0.0149    
(0.0175) 
Years since accession 
  
-0.0021***    
(0.0006) 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Omitted categories as described in Table 2. The number of observations is 14,833 in all 
specifications. Results obtained using the sample weight in the PERCEIVE survey. 
 
Table SM4. Results from the bivariate probit model without weighting 
and without clustered standard errors. 
 





-0.0712   
(0.0560) 









Occupation YES YES 
Income Level YES YES 
Perception economic situation in the  
region 
NO YES 
Perception evolution economic situation in 
the region 
NO YES 
Political Ideology YES YES 
Political Awareness YES YES 
Communal Identity NO YES 
Political-Institutional factors NO YES 
Match between needs and CP    
  objectives 
YES NO 
Demographics YES YES 
 
  
COUNTRY CONTROLS YES YES 
REGION CONTROLS YES YES 
   
r 0.2687 
 (0.1021) 
LR Test r=0        6.27 
p-value LR test 0.01 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Omitted categories 
as described in Table 2. The number of observations is 14,833 in all specifications. r denotes 
the correlation between the errors of the two equations. See notes in Table 3 for details on 
the individual and country and region controls. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
